TIME IS NIGH FOR RECOGNITION OF AFRICA’S SPECIAL NEEDS WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE REGIME
TIME IS NIGH FOR RECOGNITION OF AFRICA’S SPECIAL NEEDS WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE REGIME
For Africa, the political symbolism of recognition would be significant. It would signal that the international community understands that climate justice cannot be achieved through generic frameworks alone and reaffirm that the climate regime is not blind to the particularities of geography, history, and structural inequality. And, most importantly, it would show that multilateralism can still deliver fairness in an increasingly fragmented global order
For more than a decade, African negotiators have been calling for one simple but profound reform within the UN climate regime, and that’s the formal inclusion of a dedicated agenda item recognising Africa’s special needs and circumstances in the fight against climate change. Dismissed by those against it as sympathy-seeking and a demand for special favours, Africa insists that all it wants is fairness and institutional recognition that its vulnerability is not theoretical, but structural. And not fleeting, but entrenched in the continent’s geography, economy, and history.
The logic of the proposal is disarmingly straightforward. Africa has contributed the least to the problem of climate change, accounting for barely four percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, yet it stands to suffer the most from its effects. This contradiction, which sits at the heart of climate injustice, is the political and moral foundation of the continent’s long-standing push. Article 4.1(e) of the UNFCCC already recognises the need to consider the “specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties,” while a series of COP decisions over the years have reiterated the same. What Africa is asking for is the logical next step, and that is to translate this principle into a dedicated, operational space within the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement processes, so that Africa’s vulnerabilities, priorities, and capacities are not lost in the noise of generalities.
Africa’s special circumstances are rooted in hard realities. The continent is already experiencing more intense droughts, flash floods, cyclones, and heatwaves that devastate crops, displace communities, and strain fragile economies. Food security is deteriorating as rainfall patterns grow erratic. Rivers that sustained livelihoods for centuries are drying up. Health systems are stretched thin by climate-sensitive diseases. Infrastructure, often underdeveloped or ageing, is repeatedly wiped out by storms and floods. Each disaster, in turn, deepens debt burdens and drains scarce fiscal resources that could have been channelled into adaptation or sustainable development.
“What makes Africa’s predicament distinct is the interplay of climate vulnerability with structural economic fragility,” says Mohamed Adow, founder and director, Power Shift Africa. “Many African economies rely heavily on climate-sensitive sectors like agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, while depending on exports of raw materials to global markets that are now being reshaped by carbon-related trade measures such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). These external pressures, combined with limited access to affordable climate finance and green technologies, are narrowing the continent’s already constrained policy and fiscal space. African governments are thus faced with an impossible balancing act: how to pursue economic growth, industrialisation, and poverty reduction while simultaneously adapting to and mitigating climate change.”
It is precisely this confluence of challenges of biophysical exposure, developmental constraints, and financial vulnerability that justifies a formal agenda item focused on Africa’s special needs and circumstances. Recognition would not be symbolic, but would provide a framework through which Africa’s priorities could be integrated more systematically across the UNFCCC’s key thematic areas of adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, finance, capacity-building, and just transitions.
At its core, Africa’s ambition is to ensure that the continent’s realities are woven into the operational fabric of the climate regime. Formal recognition would mean that every major process, from the Global Stocktake (GST) to the replenishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), explicitly accounts for Africa’s vulnerabilities and capacity gaps. It would mean that the metrics for assessing progress in climate action reflect differentiated starting points, and that the support promised under Articles 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 of the Convention, as well as Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, is evaluated against Africa’s actual needs, not abstract global averages.
And yet, despite the clarity of the case, Africa’s proposal has been repeatedly blocked. Developed countries have resisted its inclusion on both political and technical grounds, citing concerns that range from procedural convenience to fiscal prudence. Some argue that recognising Africa’s special circumstances would set a precedent, encouraging other regions to demand similar treatment. Others claim it would fragment the UNFCCC agenda or require legal amendments to create a new category of Parties. Still others are wary of the financial implications, claiming that formal recognition might open the door to region-specific funding quotas or special access windows within the climate finance architecture.
These arguments, while neatly framed, are disingenuous, says Adow, noting that the UNFCCC already recognises differentiated vulnerabilities such as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and economies in transition, all of which enjoy some form of recognition or tailored support mechanism.
“What Africa seeks is not to carve out a new legal category, but to have its unique circumstances formally acknowledged through a political decision, much like the recognition granted to those other groups,” says Adow. “The proposal would not rewrite the Convention, but simply create a structured space within the existing framework to assess and address Africa’s specific implementation challenges.”
Developed countries’ procedural objections that the agenda is already overloaded, that Africa’s concerns are “mainstreamed” through existing bodies, and that new items would strain secretariat resources, are thinly veiled attempts to maintain the status quo. The reality is that Africa’s issues are scattered across multiple agenda items and subsidiary bodies with no central mechanism to integrate them. A single, dedicated agenda item would in fact enhance efficiency and coherence, consolidating fragmented discussions and providing a unified platform to monitor progress and accountability. Far from inflating the agenda, it would streamline it.
The financial argument is equally hollow. Recognition of Africa’s special circumstances does not automatically entail new financial commitments. It merely ensures that existing commitments are fulfilled in a manner consistent with Africa’s needs. It would help track whether the promised $100 billion per year and the larger sums that must follow are being delivered in ways that genuinely build African resilience and capacity. By improving coordination among financial mechanisms such as the GCF, Global Environment Facility (GEF), Adaptation Fund, and the new Loss and Damage Fund, a dedicated Africa agenda item could make climate finance delivery more targeted, efficient, and transparent.
This proposal is all about ensuring that the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), which form the moral backbone of the climate regime, are applied in practice. Recognising Africa’s circumstances is not a deviation from multilateralism, but an affirmation of it.
Moreover, the recognition of Africa’s special needs would not fragment the developing world. On the contrary, it would strengthen South–South solidarity by making visible the continent’s intersectional challenges and linking them to broader global struggles for justice and fair transitions. Many African countries are both LDCs and members of the SIDS or other vulnerable groups, and recognition of Africa’s collective circumstances would thus complement, not compete with, existing categories.
In operational terms, Africa’s proposal could be designed with pragmatic flexibility. The agenda item could be reviewed biennially, with concise reports prepared by the secretariat to assess progress and identify emerging gaps. The discussions could feed into the Global Stocktake and inform guidance to financial and technical bodies. A lean work programme or platform could then be established to coordinate action across three main functions: assessing vulnerabilities and capacity gaps; recommending scaling-up of support through existing mechanisms; and monitoring how well global actions address Africa’s realities.
Such a platform would not be a bureaucratic appendage but a strategic enabler. It would allow for systematic tracking of Africa’s climate risks, create a feedback loop between African priorities and global finance flows, and help identify opportunities for technology transfer and just transition partnerships. It could also provide space for collaboration between African institutions, such as the African Development Bank, the African Union, and regional climate centres, and global entities like the GCF, GEF, and UN agencies.
To reassure hesitant partners, we propose a “light-touch” modality that avoids heavy reporting burdens or complex institutional structures. The aim is not to add layers of process but to improve delivery and coherence. A review clause could be built in, allowing the COP to reassess the agenda item’s relevance after a defined period. This would demonstrate Africa’s willingness to keep the process efficient while maintaining focus on outcomes.
For Africa, the political symbolism of recognition would be significant. It would signal that the international community understands that climate justice cannot be achieved through generic frameworks alone and reaffirm that the climate regime is not blind to the particularities of geography, history, and structural inequality. And, most importantly, it would show that multilateralism can still deliver fairness in an increasingly fragmented global order.
But beyond symbolism, the practical benefits would be considerable. With formal recognition, Africa would be better positioned to negotiate finance flows that are predictable, concessional, and aligned with its development goals. It would strengthen Africa’s hand in shaping the terms of access to global funds and ensure that adaptation, the continent’s top priority, receives its fair share of resources. It would also enable more systematic integration of Africa’s concerns into the just transition narrative, ensuring that decarbonisation pathways do not reproduce colonial patterns of extraction and dependency.
Recognition would also serve as a powerful corrective to the growing trend of extraterritorial climate measures that penalise African economies. By linking discussions on Africa’s special circumstances to those on response measures and trade-related actions, the UNFCCC could provide a coherent multilateral framework to address these spillover effects. It would anchor Africa’s right to development firmly within the climate regime, ensuring that global climate action supports, rather than constrains, the continent’s economic transformation.
The opponents of Africa’s proposal often frame their resistance as a matter of administrative tidiness or legal consistency. But beneath these procedural arguments lies a deeper discomfort that recognition would force the system to confront its own inequities. It would expose the persistent imbalance between those who caused the problem and those who suffer its consequences and make visible the uncomfortable truth that climate vulnerability is not a matter of chance but of structure; of who has power, who has wealth, and who bears the costs.
COP30 in Belém offers the world the chance to choose substance over semantics and principle over procedure. Recognising Africa’s special needs and circumstances would not only strengthen the legitimacy of the UNFCCC, but also send a clear message that fairness, solidarity, and empathy still have a place in global climate governance. That, ultimately, is what Africa is asking for. Not exceptionalism, but equity made real.
