IN BELEM, BRAZIL IS PUSHING FOR BIOFUELS, AND THAT’S BAD FOR OUR TUMMIES
As the Belem climate talks take shape, a striking tension is emerging. On one hand, the Presidency is loudly promoting “Sustainable Agriculture and Resilient Food Systems” as a key agenda, and for us this is a logical and much-needed focus, given the climate burden borne by vulnerable regions. On the other hand, a draft plan leaked ahead of the summit reveals that COP30 is likely to push for a dramatic scale-up of biofuels and other “sustainable fuels”, aligning with paragraph 28’s iteration on fossil fuels from COP28 in Dubai. The irony is too stark to ignore as the very policies meant to secure food systems may well undermine them if biofuels are treated as a silver bullet. Let’s unpack why this matters, particularly for Africa and other developing regions, and how the interplay between agriculture, fuel, land and policy could lead to unintended consequences.
Reports suggest that Brazil will propose a global pledge at COP30 to quadruple the use of “sustainable fuels”, including biofuels, biogas, hydrogen and e-fuels, by 2034 relative to 2024 levels. While this may seem commendable in the decarbonisation narrative, it raises alarm bells when we consider feedstocks, land use, food systems and equity. Biofuels are often heralded as a transition away from fossil fuels as crops are grown or residues are processed into fuel rather than petrol or diesel. But, as critics note, the model can easily become food crops for fuel, meaning farmland previously used to feed people is diverted to fuel production. In effect, the “food vs. fuel” debate, long dormant, is reignited with full force in Belem.
At COP28 in Dubai, food systems were formally placed on the agenda as the “Emirates Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems and Climate Action” secured endorsement from 158 countries. The document emphasised integrating agriculture into climate plans and boosting resilience of producers. However, it conspicuously omitted any firm commitment to phase out fossil fuels from food systems, despite the fact that food systems account for at least 15 % of global fossil fuel use. This omission should point us to the dilemma ahead. On one hand we declare the need for “resilient food systems”, but on the other we may promote a fuel-crop boom that puts pressure on those same systems.
The risk to food production
First, large-scale biofuel feedstock cultivation often competes directly with food crops. Crops such as maize, sorghum, cassava, sugarcane and oil palm, which are staples in many African diets, are also feedstocks. A growing body of research shows that increased demand for biofuels can push food crop producers out of land, raise food prices and undermine food security. Second, historical data reinforces the link between biofuel production and food price spikes. For instance, the 2007-2008 food price crisis was in part attributed to biofuel demand diverting grains from food markets. The OECD’s recent modelling finds that reducing biofuel feedstock commodities by 20 % could dampen food price surges by more than half following extreme shocks. Third, in Africa, small-scale farmers feed a large portion of the population. When land, water and subsidies shift toward fuel crops for global markets, smallholders can lose access to prime land, resources shift away from food production and resilience erodes. And, fourth, biofuel feedstocks often require intensive inputs such as water, fertiliser, mechanisation, and sometimes monoculture expansion or deforestation. This can degrade land, reduce biodiversity, and undermine the very resilience of food systems that COP declarations promise to strengthen.
For Africa, the irony is rich and troubling. The COP28 food systems declaration notes that we must support vulnerable farmers, build resilient agriculture and integrate food into climate action. But the looming biofuel push at COP30 threatens to undercut exactly that ambition. If land and resources are diverted toward biofuel feedstocks for export fuel markets, what happens to the millions of smallholder farmers producing staple crops, or national food security plans that depend on domestic production and affordable staples, or adaptation efforts in agriculture that rely on investment, local knowledge, land access and stable markets? African negotiators know this. They have warned that without careful safeguards, biofuel mandates elsewhere become hunger mandates at home. For example, the Ghana-based AbibiNsroma Foundation and others have reported how land grabs and crops diverted for biofuels undermine food security and livelihoods.
At COP28, discussions about fossil fuel phase-out encountered heavy push-back. As a King College London policy brief on the matter notes, the deal referenced “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems” but included loopholes (e.g., “efforts toward phase-down”) and did not extend robustly into agriculture or food systems. The iteration of paragraph 28 (or equivalent) on fossil fuels appears to have opened the door to other types of fuels (biofuels, biomass) being counted as climate solutions. In other words, if we can’t phase out fossil fuels outright, perhaps we shift to fuels labelled “sustainable” (e.g., biofuels) and still claim climate ambition. But the risk is that this shift happens without due attention to food and land implications. Hence COP30 might adopt language that emphasises sustainable biofuels and biomass as part of the energy transition. The problem with this is that, for many regions, this means fueling hunger in the name of avoiding fossil fuel use.
Why we should be cautious, and what Africa should demand
Given the risks, here are some reasons Africa and the global South more broadly should approach the biofuel push with caution and certain demands:
Prioritise food security: Before scaling biofuels, ensure that food production, land access for food crops, smallholder rights and local nutrition are protected. If fuel mandates divert food, then climate policy becomes counter-productive.
Avoid first-generation feedstocks: Many of the studies underline that biofuels grown from existing food crops are particularly risky (maize, sugarcane, soy, cassava). Second-generation biofuels (residues, waste, non-food crops) may help, but scale and market viability remain uncertain.
Embed safeguards and rights frameworks: Land rights, free prior and informed consent (FPIC), local benefit-sharing, smallholder inclusion, avoiding large-scale monocultures must be central. Otherwise, biofuel expansion becomes land grabbing disguised.
Ensure food systems-first approach: Any fuel or energy transition policy must be integrated into food security, agriculture resilience and development planning, not layered on top as an afterthought.
Transparency and accountability: If biofuels are part of COP30 commitments, metrics must be clear: needed land, feedstock type, impact assessments on food production and hunger. Without transparency, the risk of hidden harms increases.
Diversification and local value-addition: Africa should push for strategies that do not relegate it to producing fuel crops for export, but enable local processing, value addition, diversified agriculture and food sovereignty.
Potential scenarios and impacts for Africa
Let’s consider a few hypothetical but plausible scenarios to illustrate how the biofuel push at COP30 could play out, and what the implications might be:
Scenario A: The quadruple biofuel pledge
COP30 adopts a global pledge to quadruple biofuel production by 2034. Feedstock demand ramps up. In Africa, land previously used by smallholders for food crops is leased for large plantations of sugarcane, cassava or jatropha for export biofuel. Food crop yields fall or shift, food security worsens, staple prices rise, hunger grows.
Scenario B: Mixed fuel/food production
Biofuel expansion is required, but with safeguards. Some land is used for crops that can be dual-use (food + fuel); smallholders are integrated into value chains; local processing is encouraged. Yet, without strong regulation, there’s still a risk of resource diversion, ecological strain and inequitable benefit distribution.
Scenario C: Biofuel expansion without food system integration
Fuel mandates dominate. Governments shift subsidies, land tenure reform favours large agribusiness, food crops are displaced, smallholder livelihoods collapse. Food imports increase, local production shrinks, domestic prices spike. The proclaimed “sustainable agriculture” agenda turns out to be lip-service.
For Africa, the difference between these scenarios is material. The stakes are food security, sovereignty, development pathways, rights of smallholder farmers and communities. Which is why we are insisting that the irony of championing “resilient food systems” on one hand while accelerating biofuel demands on the other cannot be ignored. We welcome transition away from fossil fuels, but not if that transition eats the land that feeds our people. We welcome innovation, but not at the cost of food sovereignty. We demand climate justice, but we roundly rejected spray-painted green schemes that end up fueling hunger.
